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Abstract 
The tactical level is academically not well developed and there is a paucity of literature on 
the former. Yet it has become more important in the recent years mainly due to shrinking 
defence budgets and the increasing number of multinational joint operations. This incites 
nations to integrate more closely and armies find themselves cooperating at ever lower unit-
levels. Such integration necessitates a similar understanding of tactics to remain effective. 
Officers first formally encounter tactics during their training at military academies. This 
thesis examines how junior officers are educated in tactics at the Norwegian Military 
Academy and two comparable United States Marine Corps schools. Based on established 
military theory, indicators for effective tactical education are formulated and applied to the 
teaching in these schools. The thesis uncovers that the schools’ theoretical approach to 
tactical education is essentially identical, but its practical implementation differs.  
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1. Introduction 
The role of national tactical doctrines and practise is understudied. While there is a vast 
literature on strategy and so-called 'operational art', little has been published on tactical art 
and specifically how it is taught. Those who teach tactics regularly at military academies do 
not seem to have the incentive or time to identify and articulate scientifically how they 
accomplish effective tactical education. Findings worth disseminating to improve 
international cooperation might therefore be overlooked. 
 
Perhaps tactical art is unimportant, therefore so little attention paid to it in academic writing 
and scholarship? The opposite, however, is true; I will argue, as multinational joint 
operations1 are at ever lower levels in the chain of command; from the typical battalion-
level contribution to company-level and lower as cost factors force Western armies to 
integrate faster and more profoundly. Moreover, contemporary battle is not confined to the 
battle-space but has effects far beyond it due to digital media. The potential strategic effects 
from a single engagement are as many as the legion stakeholders in the internet age. The 
infamous 'strategic corporal' is a symbol of just this: action at the tactical level can have 
strategic effects.2 Western militaries’ technological advantage is also being reduced, often 
due to cyber-espionage.3 This prompted former US General Perkins to focus on cognitive 
aspects in the US Army’s next doctrine: ‘It’s hard to steal training and leadership, you can’t 
                                                        
1 An operation carried out by forces of two or more nations, in which elements of at least 
two services participate (NATO Standardization Office (2017), p.76). 
2 Krulak (1999b) 
3 Farley (2018) 
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hack into it and it won’t fit on a thumb drive’.4 All this makes tactics and its education the 
more important. 
 
We should therefore devote attention to tactics and to the question of whether it is taught 
in similar ways across national cultures. This thesis is a small contribution in that direction. 
When battalions and even companies are multi-national it is of the utmost importance that 
these act in the same way because decisions about action and action itself have to be swift 
and coordinated. It is therefore pertinent to ask whether there are national variations in the 
teaching of tactical art and how such differences can be overcome. Also, it makes sense to 
ask whether one military academy can learn from another; i.e. who has the ‘best practise’ in 
this field? In the age of military integration, armies must share tactical doctrine and learn to 
fight the same way to be able to fight at all. Ideally, they should all share the same tactical 
doctrine and practise the same tactical art. 
 
In strategy there are national traditions, much studied under the rubric of ‘strategic 
culture’.5 As stated, there is scant academic literature on tactics, to be elaborated on below. 
We therefore do not know much about national variations in tactical art. It seems 
reasonable to assume that there will be little national variation in tactical art because tactics 
is really about 'how to do it' in similar war-fighting situations, hence, we should not expect 
national differences in how tactics is developed and applied. Unlike strategy where national 
political interests influence directly, at the tactical level the battle is 'the same' to every 
army. If I am right about this, there is little problem in integrating armies, even at low levels, 
                                                        
4 Kimmons (2016) 
5 Snyder (1977, 1990); Britz (2016) 
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because they can be assumed to have been taught and to have practised the same tactical 
art. Yet this hopeful hypothesis must he examined and tested — perhaps there are national 
traditions in tactics, as there are in strategic culture? 
 
This thesis will investigate to what extent tactical art is common to two armies of NATO, the 
United States Marine Corps (USMC) and the Norwegian Army by examining and comparing 
their junior officer education. The Norwegians serve under US command in many 
international operations and the USMC is ear-marked for the defence of Norway, now as 
throughout the Cold War. As we shall see in section 1.3, contemporary Russian revisionism 
has also made USMC presence in Norway more important and these armies can therefore be 
assumed to not only cooperate, but also have to train and perhaps fight together. The 
practical utility of comparing their teaching and practise of tactics is therefore obvious. This 
comparison is also important as a likely ‘first’ comparative study of tactics in NATO schools.6 
Naturally I cannot generalise from a case study of only two schools, but I will at least be able 
to see if education in tactics is largely the same in both cases, and this will provide an 
indication of whether my hypothesis is correct, viz. whether tactics is ‘unproblematic’ from a 
national and cultural perspective, therefore making military integration easy, even at the 
lowest levels. 
 
1.1. The research question and analytical framework 
As we shall elaborate on below, tactical art is in essence a mind-set, a particular way of 
thinking about problem-solving, i.e. winning battles. Officers first formally encounter tactics 
                                                        
6 The scope of this thesis does not allow me to include two other armies that I plan to 
examine in a later and more comprehensive study, the British and the French armies. 
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at military schools and it is therefore pertinent to examine this at the Norwegian Military 
Academy (NMA) and USMC counterparts. After all, both schools explicitly state that they 
teach their officers how to think and not what to think.7 The main aim of this thesis is thus to 
investigate military educational methods for teaching tactics to uncover practices that would 
ameliorate cooperation. An auxiliary aim is to contribute to developing the literature on 
tactics in the military and scholarly profession. The research question is as follows: 
Is tactics similar across armies? Are there transferable lessons between 
schools so USMC and Norwegian officers can think more alike, and thus 
fight more effectively together? 
The research design for this thesis consists of a qualitative study complemented by 
interviews with military practitioners in the schools that make the case study. As doctrines 
usually only describe a desired mode of operation, research is complemented by semi-
structured interviews with practitioners that give evidence of actual practice. Additionally, e-
mail correspondence with the authors of doctrines further clarifies the intended meaning of 
specific publications. Due to the lack of published material and to the classified nature of 
military education, a study trip was conducted to gain insight into educational methods. 
During the first week of May 2018 I visited the UMSC University in Quantico, VA where I was 
introduced to the educational methods of The Basic School and (TBS) the Expeditionary 
Warfare School (EWS), the USMC’s basic and intermediate officer courses in tactics. As a 
tactics instructor at the NMA I have first-hand knowledge of the thinking and practice there. 
 
                                                        
7 Krigsskolen (2017), p.44; Expeditionary Warfare School (2018b) 
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1.2. Literature review 
Compared to strategy the field of tactics is understudied. There is scant literature of a 
scholarly kind. Friedman accurately sums this up in the first lines of On Tactics: 
There has never been a true tactical theorist. Although giants of strategic 
theory touched on tactics, their focus was always on strategy. Tactics in 
general has been viewed as too technical a subject for theory, and the 
mechanistic movement of troops and materiel as too scientific to catch the 
theorist’s eye.8 
Finding literature on the education of tactics is therefore challenging, especially within the 
timeframe of this thesis. There is no dedicated database on tactics and conducting field 
research seems to be the only viable option. The study trip to the USMC indicated that their 
methods for teaching tactics follow an evolutionary approach with yearly incremental 
improvements. The result is high quality education, but the teachers do not really know why 
this is so.  
 
Presented below are the measures taken to find any prior relevant research. In sum, almost 
no relevant literature was identified; yet this does not exclude the possibility of its existence, 
most likely as classified internal officer-exchange reports. Therefore some arguments might 
not be as well informed and conclusions more tentative than I would prefer. 
 
                                                        
8 Friedman (2017), p.1 
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Existing literature comparing military education is outdated and does not go into detail on 
tactics specifically. A list of identified works, most found with the assistance of personnel at 
King’s College’s Maughan Library, is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
Moreover, few journals address tactics and none examine national differences regarding 
education of the latter. A comprehensive list of reviewed journals and search methods is 
presented in Appendix 2. Journals covering military affairs from a strategic perspective are 
numerous, yet few of them address the tactical dimension. The reason for this is most likely 
because it is a difficult field to research, the target audience is rather small, and few 
professionals actually write and publish within the field. Most would argue that it is an 
eminently practical field and therefore does not lend itself to academic study. The problem 
with such a ‘common-sensical’ approach is that it becomes reliant on anecdotal evidence 
from various battles. However, given the importance of tactics, we cannot rely on anecdotes 
when teaching in this field. 
 
Norwegian military databases display few relevant results. The Norwegian Defence College 
publishes all unclassified theses from 2007 and has (only) one such document in the 
category ‘tactics’. 9 The NMA also publishes unclassified theses from 2007 but yields no 
results for ‘tactics’.10 However, some pre-2007 theses in the academy’s library catalogue do 
cover tactics.11 These stem from when the NMA offered an intermediate course before staff-
                                                        
9 Forsvarets Høyskole (n.d.) 
10 Krigsskolen (n.d.) 
11 Krigsskolen (n.d.) 
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college. Yet, despite a higher level of reflection concerning tactics, none of these documents 
addresses how tactics is understood and taught among Western armies.  
 
Existing US theses are not particularly relevant either. The Marine Corps University displays a 
list of theses from its School of Advanced Warfare,12 whilst those from US Army and USMC 
Command and Staff College are stored at the Defence Technical Information Center.13 The 
archaic search engine at the latter location makes it particularly challenging to find relevant 
documents. Still, searches at either location yield no relevant results for teaching tactics. 
 
There is thus little research to build on concerning different armies’ tactical art.  
 
1.3. Armies compared 
This thesis compares the USMC to the Norwegian Army because they are close and regular 
allies. The US and Norway are founding members of NATO, have a long history of being part 
of coalitions and a common interest in the North Atlantic and the Arctic, given the 
importance of the strategic Russian bases on Kola.14 This is evidenced by the recent common 
effort to reinstate a NATO command for the North Atlantic.15 Their navies share 
interoperable platforms16 and their air forces are composed of F-35 fighters and P-8 
maritime patrol aircrafts.17 However virtually no military materiel is the same across both 
                                                        
12 USMC Library (n.d.) 
13 USMC Library (n.d.); DTIC (n.d.) 
14 Olsen (2017) 
15 Johnsen (2017) 
16 Lockheed Martin (2017b, 2017a) 
17 Lockheed Martin (2017c) 
 14 
nation’s armies, and regular exercises are necessary to uphold an acceptable level of inter-
operability. 
 
USMC and Norwegian Army cooperation is likely to increase. The USMC has a rotational 
presence and prepositioned materiel in Norway. In 2018, the USMC doubled its presence to 
700 marines.18 The establishment of greater force levels and participation in a standing 
multinational joint force are strong indicators of how important the US is to Norway and 
particularly vice-versa. Despite the fact that the US already partakes in regular NATO 
exercises in the Arctic and undergo cold weather training in Norway, the recent increases in 
cooperation will undoubtedly imply more training at the tactical level. Also, in recent years, 
USMC companies have been subordinated to Norwegian battalions.19 We thus have a 
situation where Norwegians may also command Americans. This underscores the 
importance of a common understanding of tactics. 
 
1.4. Sources 
The thesis bases itself on the analysis of military doctrines, teaching plans, manuals and 
interviews with practitioners at TBS and EWS. Sources are primarily written in English or 
Norwegian. Most are of a military character so formulations and expressions have 
identifiable counterparts in English military vocabulary. Norwegian translations should 
therefore be within academic standards. 
 
                                                        
18 Forsvarsdepartementet (2018) 
19 Merrimarahajara (2016); Precht (2016) 
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Military doctrines of smaller states are often similar to those of larger ones. Since smaller 
nations cannot match the research and development budgets of the US, more often than 
not it is possible to identify strong similarities in structure and content in their doctrines 
because they partially adopt them from the US.20 This is particularly true after the 
emergence of the manoeuvre warfare concept in the 80s that spurred a ‘doctrinal 
renaissance’ among NATO allies.21 Thus, the 2004 Norwegian Army doctrine bears close 
resemblance to the 2001 US Army FM 3-90.22 Moreover, Bjerga argues that small state 
doctrines are ‘utilised for the purpose of promoting political, legal and ethical messages to 
the military, to a domestic audience, and to international allies’ to the detriment of 
operational effectiveness.23 Norwegian doctrine can thus be expected to be theoretically 
similar to those of larger states, but in practice be sub-optimal for the Norwegian Army and 
its challenges. 
 
The interviews conducted during the study trip give evidence of actual practice at the USMC. 
The format of the interviews was semi-structured to let the interviewees themselves tell 
their story. General background information and purpose of the interview was, however, 
sent out beforehand in the formal requests-for-visit to ensure that relevant data was 
gathered. Ethical approval was communicated verbally during the interview or in writing 
afterwards in accordance with King’s Research Ethics Office. The interviews were conducted 
without audio-recording to allow the interviewees to speak more freely. The author took 
notes that were transcribed no later than a few days after each interview. A list of interviews 
                                                        
20 Bjerga and Haaland (2010), p.506 
21 Shamir, 2018, p.43 
22 Sæveraas (2007), p.145 
23 Bjerga and Haaland (2010) 
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can be found in Appendix 3. The interviewees were core members of the respective school’s 
faculty and were enthusiastic about showing how they interpreted doctrine into training, 
giving insight into actual practice. 
 
The interviewees were not selected by the author but chosen by their respective schools 
based on availability and the questions submitted beforehand. The requests-for-visit were 
sent through official channels, via the respective nations’ Departments of Defence and 
Foreign Affairs, and it is thus reasonable to assume that the schools made their best 
qualified people available for interview. This is supported by the positions the interviewees 
held at the various schools: at EWS, these were the Director of Curriculum and his most 
senior instructor, and at TBS, the Warfighting Director and his two most senior instructors. 
The civilian equivalent to both director positions is head of faculty. Additionally, the author’s 
current position as instructor in tactics at the Norwegian Military Academy gives him a 
degree of professional competence in conducting the interviews. As peers, familiar with the 
same literature and facing similar educational challenges, it is easy to discuss the thematic as 
colleagues. In sum, it is reasonable to assume that even if the interviews covered few 
instructors and lasted only a short time, they were conducted with the most relevant 
personnel and did thus produce relevant data.  
 
The thesis also draws on literature central in military theory and therefore present in 
doctrines. This includes works from antiquity translated during the Enlightenment and 
Clausewitz’ On War. Greek and Roman works from antiquity provide valuable insight into 
 17 
the foundation of Western military thought. 24 Due to their precarious situation between 
East and West, Edward Luttwak argues that the Byzantines made strenuous effort to make 
the best use of their limited resources, thus advancing military thinking on tactics.25 
Furthermore, interpretational errors of Clausewitz have been mitigated by consulting 
multiple English translations. The Howard and Paret version, considered to be the standard 
translation in the English-speaking world, is known to diverge from the original in its quest to 
anglicise and improve the readability of the text.26  
 
1.5. Structure 
The thesis is divided into two major parts. The first introduces the research question and 
examines the foundations of tactics and of the current ‘Western way of war’, manoeuvre 
warfare, concluding with a set of indicators for effective tactical education. The second part 
is comprised of case studies on USMC and NMA junior officer schools where these indicators 
are sought after. 
  
                                                        
24 Heuser (2010), pp.3–11 
25 Luttwak (2011), pp.57–58 
26 Strachan (2007), p.ix; Honig (2007) 
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2. Tactical art 
This section will first delineate a definition of tactics to serve as a point of reference in the 
subsequent case studies, and thereafter provide contextual background about the 
manoeuvre warfare concept used by most Western armies. Both sections will conclude with 
a set of specific indicators for effective tactical education summed up at the end of the 
chapter. 
 
2.1. Defining tactics 
La théorie est le pied droit et l'expérience le pied gauche,  
il faut avoir les deux pieds pour marcher.27 
Georg Friedrich von Tempelhof  
This section will argue that tactics is the art and science of winning battles and engagements, 
in which the use of guile is favoured over force; drawing on the ancient Greek’s 
identification of force and guile.  
 
Guile is more common, useful and preferred in tactics than in strategy. According to 
Lawrence Freedman, force vs. guile is the most powerful dichotomy in all strategic 
thought.28 Since strategy and tactics are historically intertwined, this dichotomy is arguably 
also valid for tactics and figures prominently in Martin van Creveld’s entry on tactics in the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica.29 Force vs. guile is most famously developed as themes by Homer 
                                                        
27 Tempelhof (1794), p.176 
28 Freedman (2013), p.42 
29 van Creveld (2017) 
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in his epic poems The Iliad and The Odyssey in the personifications of Achilles and 
Odysseus.30 The former, representing Βία (Biê), meaning force, seeks victory in the physical 
domain through direct methods, whilst the latter, representing Μῆτις (Mêtis), meaning skill 
and practical wisdom, pursues victory in the mental domain through indirect methods.31 
Since Troy was not destroyed by force but rather by guile in the form of Odysseus’ Trojan 
Horse, Homer may have suggested that force will ultimately fall short and give way to a 
world in which success in combat is achieved primarily through guile.32 In warfare, where the 
stakes are often either life or death, fighting in a way that enables victory with the minimal 
expenditure of own forces is surely preferred: why risk a battle in which only force-numbers 
have precedence when a cunning plan can tip the balance? Even though Western society 
might naturally deplore winning by cunning or subterfuge, exemplified by the pursuit of the 
‘fair game’ in football, it still holds in high regard those military leaders who succeeded 
through guile; after all, ‘war has no traffic with rules.’33 Indeed, history provides many 
famous examples of guile, including how Napoleon feigned weakness to lure and defeat the 
larger Russian and Austrian armies into battle at Austerlitz, how Rommel was a cunning 
‘Desert Fox’ in an honourable ‘war without hate’,34 or the established Russian military 
deception concept ‘maskirovka’.35 
 
Military manuals and doctrine have also continuously emphasized guile in the form of 
cunning plans or stratagems: from the most ancient documents on war from China, to the 
                                                        
30 Dunkle (1987) 
31 Ibid.; Freedman (2013), p.43 
32 Dunkle (1987), p.18 
33 The Infantry Journal, Inc. (1939), p.1 
34 Bierman and Smith (2004) 
35 Beaumont (1982) 
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Greek, Roman and Byzantine field manuals that served as the foundation for contemporary 
military thought when they were rediscovered during the Enlightenment (notably by 
Machiavelli).36 Notable references to guile in these works are displayed in Appendix 4. These 
publications give evidence of a desire to preserve valuable tactical experiences and 
disseminate it to future military commanders. Apart from the technical arrangements of 
units, substantial energy is devoted to communicating what was probably hard learned 
lessons from wars. The descriptions of creative and cunning plans highlight the artistic 
quality of tactics learned through practice. They also indicate that it is possible to learn 
certain aspects of tactics through the study of past experiences and by familiarising oneself 
with what is actually possible to accomplish. The mere fact of being aware of the 
characteristics of past encounters will help an inexperienced commander detect the signs of 
an ambush or give him combat-proven ideas that can turn the tide of a battle in his favour. 
This is what psychologist Daniel Kahneman calls ‘priming’ which will be further investigated 
in section 2.3 along with other cognitive aspects and their influence on tactics.37 
 
With the Enlightenment’s growing confidence in empirical science and the application of 
reason, leading to the study of war conducted in the same spirit, military manuals became 
rather associated with universal principles and checklists of consideration than cunning or 
guile.38 This was also a practical consequence of the sheer size of the then standing armies 
and served to formally distinguish strategy from tactics – a distinction not made in the 
literature of antiquity and early modern period.39 With the establishment of levels of war by 
                                                        
36 Heuser (2010), pp.89–97; Freedman (2013), pp.42–53 
37 Kahneman (2012), p.52 
38 Freedman (2013), pp.72–75 
39 Heuser (2010), p.4 
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Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte de Guibert in General Essay on Tactics,40 military literature 
focused more on whole armies and their utility in reaching political goals. This was clearly so 
in Clausewitz’ On War. According to van Creveld, Clausewitz ‘belittles the effect of 
maneuver, surprise and stratagems’ for the strategic level, 41 yet, still considers surprise and 
cunning the way to gain superiority in tactics.42 Contemporary manuals also emphasise 
guile43 and in our time international humanitarian law outlines specific rules for ‘ruses of 
war’.44 We should therefore expect a strong focus on guile in tactics and in education on 
tactics. 
 
Tactics is an art and a science where a scientific approach is used to shape tactical 
judgement based on personal or historical experience and the art is the application of this 
judgement to tactical problems. As military historian Robert Doughty points out, 
‘establishing the nature of war has been a pastime of professional soldiers for centuries.’45 
There is arguably a dichotomy between those that approach war as a technical activity with 
relatively fixed laws and those that believe that handling friction and human will in war 
requires intuitive skill. Another perspective on the matter is represented by Prussian military 
writer Georg Heinrich von Berenhorst who in 1798 observed that most cultures had mainly 
passed on lessons learnt empirically from experiences of previous wars and battles, rather 
than trying to rise above such empiricism and attempt to approach warfare from the 
                                                        
40 Guibert (1772), p.28 
41 van Creveld, (2015), p.60 
42 Idem p.198 
43 USMC (1997b), p.52 
44 International Committee of the Red Cross (n.d.) 
45 Doughty (1977) 
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perspective of theoretical approaches.46 Beatrice Heuser provides the most thorough 
analysis of the evolution of the dichotomy art vs. science in an essay to a former teacher.47 
She argues that depending on the historic period and their military education, professionals 
have favoured either art or science. She also points out that ‘the current usage of both terms 
in English is the exact opposite of its original use’, which makes the search for historical 
references precarious for anyone oblivious of this: ‘”art” came to mean something done with 
instinct, intuition and talent (even genius), not by rote, reflection, or reasoning.’48  
 
Greek and Roman writings from antiquity display a similar dichotomy, albeit one that 
converges. The Greek military commander and philosopher Arrian of Nicomedia named his 
treatise on military tactics Τέχνη τακτική (Technê Taktike),49 whereas Byzantine Emperor Leo 
VI ‘The Wise’ explicitly defines tactics as έπιστήμη (Epistêmê).50 According to the Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Technê is most often translated as ‘skill or craft’ (art), whilst 
Epistêmê is rather ‘scientific knowledge’.51 They also refer to Aristotle’s writings as the best 
source for analysis of these ‘virtues of thought’ and provide a comprehensive study of his 
interpretations across his most significant works. They argue that despite Aristotle’s position 
on the ‘certain’52 and ‘eternal’53 nature of science, he affirmed that the two virtues in reality 
converge: science and art aspire to ‘universal judgment’.54 In other words, the commander 
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who is experienced but incapable of turning this into judgment does not possess knowledge; 
just like Fredrich II’s mules who had seen 10 campaigns but were still incapable of tactics.55 
Conversely, the commander who can analyse his experiences possesses knowledge.56 The 
many authors of the Enlightenment who translated and built upon the military manuals of 
antiquity were unlikely to have benefitted from such an exhaustive analysis of Greek 
expressions. The French military theoretician Paul-Gédéon Joly de Maïzeroy, credited for 
introducing the term strategy into the Western vernacular languages,57 translated Emperor 
Leo VI’s Taktika and defined tactics as an art and a science: ‘La tactique est la science des 
mouvements qui se font à la guerre, […]; c'est l'art de ranger les troupes’.58 If we admit that 
this and other translations may have inappropriately used some of each historical period’s 
contemporary assumptions about the relation between art and science, it is not difficult to 
understand the continuing dichotomy we still witness today. It is therefore simpler to settle 
on tactics being both art and science, but with the common aspiration of universal 
judgement derived from experience. This is what Doughty, and others such as Clausewitz,59 
Moltke the Elder,60 Pershing,61 and Fuller62 concluded with: The science element lies in the 
systematic approach to studying tactics allowing the military leader to hone his judgement; 
the art lies in the subsequent use of this judgement to successfully employ troops in war 
where every situation is unique. We should therefore expect education on tactics to include 
concrete measures for shaping this judgement through a scientific approach, and methods 
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for training the art of applying this judgement, notably in students with no prior military 
experience. 
 
Tactics concern battles and engagements. To further define tactics it is necessary to delimit 
it from strategy. Emperor Leo VI’s Taktika provides the oldest distinction: ‘Battle is defined 
as a partial war that occurs frequently in the course of the entire war.’63 Clausewitz defined 
strategy as ‘the use of engagements for the object of the war’ and tactics as ‘the use of 
armed forces in the engagement’.64 According to Graham’s translation, Clausewitz also 
distinguishes between engagements (Treffen) that are unexpected encounters with the 
enemy, and battles (Schlacht) that are rather deliberate ones.65 It is therefore possible to 
establish a hierarchy in which battles and engagements are at the bottom, being more 
temporally and locally limited than wars and often marked by unpremeditated actions. At 
the same time they are part of a ‘whole’ in that they have to fulfil the ‘object the war’ to be 
worth the effort. Thus, it is in the battle or engagement that the quality of the commander’s 
judgement of the situation and his subsequent decisions on the employment of his forces for 
the object of war are ultimately put to the test. Tactical education therefore not only needs 
to shape the judgement necessary to win an engagement, but also make this victory 
significant for the strategic level.  
 
In sum, indicators of effective tactical education include: fostering guile, shaping judgement 
through a scientific approach, and training the application of this judgement, especially in 
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view of strategic objectives. Before contemplating what consequences this poses for the 
education of tactics, it is necessary to understand the current ‘Western way of war.’ 
 
2.2. Manoeuvre warfare 
Manoeuvre is the expression of the art of war.66 
General Sir Rupert Smith 
Manoeuvre warfare (MW) is an American concept conceived in the 1970s by civilian scholars 
and military practitioners.67 In essence, it is a mindset that seeks to defeat the enemy’s will 
to fight, as opposed to destroying his means.68 However, the concept remains contested due 
to its controversial foundation on interpretations of military history and psychology and to 
the polarisation of the defence debate it induced and is still associated with.69 Nevertheless, 
MW is the way of war presently adhered to by both the USMC and the Norwegian Army, 
therefore shaping their education in tactics, particularly in the cognitive domain. 
 
MW developed as a reaction to US bureaucratisation of war.70 Its conception coincided with 
the publication of US Army doctrines after the Vietnam war designed to deal with perceived 
Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces in Europe.71 The first doctrine, 1976 Active 
Defense,72 was severely criticized by civilian scholars and subsequently reworked into 1982’s 
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AirLand Battle.73 William Lind and Edward Luttwak, part of the ‘defence community’ 
established during the Cold War,74 reproached the Army’s defensive posture and fixation on 
material war, illustrated notably by the preoccupation with body-counts in Vietnam.75 This 
argument is also apparent in Lind’s MW ‘canon’ of literature that he regularly references.76 
Here, practically all entries highlight the perils of viewing soldiers as ‘mere machines’77 or 
cadets as ‘factory products’.78 Further, Martin van Creveld’s book Fighting Power, comparing 
German and US Army performance in WW2, is particularly poignant.79 He states that the 
German army possessed higher ‘fighting power’ than the US,80 an expression he borrows 
from German interwar doctrine’s Kampfkraft81 and defines as ‘the sum total of mental 
qualities that make armies fight.’82 He argues that America, ‘the home of Taylorism’,83 had 
lower Kampfkraft because it chose to regard war ‘not so much as a struggle between 
opposing troops, but rather as one whose outcome would be decided largely by machines.’84 
This is at the core of what Lind et al. named ‘attrition warfare’ and subsequently sought to 
change with MW.85  
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MW developed from two main sources: former US Air Force Colonel John Boyd’s 
presentation Patterns of Conflict and German Bewegungskrieg (manoeuvre/movement 
warfare).86 John Boyd, a former fighter-pilot turned instructor and co-designer of the highly 
successful F-16,87 influenced many people, including Lind, with his eccentric personality and 
convincing argumentation in Patterns of Conflict.88 Here, Boyd lists numerous historical 
battles where an inferior force defeated a superior one and seeks to uncover the reason for 
their success. He argues that ‘all conflict is composed of repeated, time-competitive’89 
OODA-cycles (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) and that the army with superior ‘insight, initiative, 
adaptability and harmony’ will successfully perform these cycles faster than the opponent.90 
When the opponent’s actions become delayed they are increasingly irrelevant, and as ‘he 
desperately seeks convergence, he gets ever increasing divergence.’91 Eventually, the 
opponent realises he can do nothing that works, which usually leads him either to panic or 
defeat, often while still physically largely intact.92 Fighting in a faster manner than your 
enemy can therefore provoke his mental collapse and this is the central idea that Lind et al. 
based MW upon. However, before examining this, a comment on Boyd’s research is 
necessary. 
 
Boyd’s research is ‘quasi-scientific’.93 In Destruction and Creation, Boyd introduces his 
decision-making model and states that humans comprehend and cope with their 
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environment through the creation and destruction of mental patterns on which they base 
their decisions.94 However, his supporting argumentation attempts to fuse together Gödel's 
ontological proof, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, entropy and the second law of 
thermodynamics(!)95 – ‘utterly unreasonable,’ according to military historian Niklas 
Zetterling.96 Modern psychological research, which we will examine in the next section, has 
nevertheless shown that Boyd’s concept of mental patterns is actually quite valid. However, 
Boyd’s ‘mental gymnastics’ reveal the logical fallacies of his theories when he is not present 
in situ to assert his arguments, casting doubt over MW’s foundation.97 The other central 
issue with MW concerns a limited interpretation of Soviet Deep Battle,98 Israeli performance 
during the Yom Kippur war, but especially of Blitzkrieg. 
 
The desire to emulate Blitzkrieg is central to MW proponents. In Patterns of Conflict, the 
space Boyd devotes to Blitzkrieg equals that devoted to all his other examples combined.99 
Furthermore, Lind has himself stated that he is particularly interested in German military 
history.100 Together with USMC officers at Quantico, Lind disseminated Boyd’s thinking and 
endeavoured to develop a practical application of the MW concept.101 Michael Wyly, head of 
tactics at the USMC Amphibious Warfare School, was dissatisfied with the methodological 
focus of the military102 and sought to restore what was ‘good about tactics’.103 Blitzkrieg is 
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the popular name for WW2 German Bewegungskrieg, literally meaning manoeuvre 
warfare,104 and Wyly admits this was but ‘a fitting name’ for their emerging concept.105 
Indeed, many other German military expressions are found in MW: Auftragstaktik became 
Mission Command, Schwerpunkt became main effort, etc.106 However, adopting another 
army’s doctrine ‘is not something you put on like a coat.’107 
 
Bewegungskrieg is a product of Prussian society and its strategic challenges and may 
therefore be unfit for contemporary Western armies. Military historian Robert Citino argues 
that this way of war evolved since the 1600s108 to cope with Prussia’s ‘unfortunate tight 
spot’ in the heart of Europe109 and keep its wars ‘kurz und wives’ (short and lively).110 This 
generated ‘an army with an extremely high level of battlefield aggression, an officer corps 
that tended to launch attacks no matter what the odds, and a flexible system of command 
that left a great deal of initiative […] in the hands of lower-ranking commanders.’111 This 
independence, Citino argues, is a product of Prussia’s distinct social contract between the 
King and Junker-nobility and not applicable to contemporary Western armies.112 ‘Soldiers in 
the US are citizens, with the same rights and privileges as the officer, and [the officer] will 
never have the right to use [the soldiers] independently in the manner of a Prussian 
[commander].’113 Given these differences, what then is the feasibility of MW in Western 
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democratic societies? The answer is likely found in the challenging balance between having a 
cost-effective and financially predictable peace-time army that is still ruthless and lethal 
when used in unpredictable combat. After all, many wars have begun with the replacement 
of underperforming ‘peace-time’ officers.114 
 
MW is a mindset that emphasises speed, empowers the individual soldier and concentrates 
on the belligerent’s cognitive domain.115 Despite its questionable foundations repeatedly 
criticised for unoriginality116 and misuse of history,117 MW marked a return to a 
Clausewitzian view on war where friction and chance reduce the effectiveness of detailed 
planning.118 The focus is on speed to ‘out-cycle’ the opponent’s decision-making process 
provoking his mental collapse. This means giving more independence to junior officers who 
often possess better situational awareness to make decisions based on intent rather than on 
explicit orders – so-called Mission Command – whilst at the same time highlighting the level 
of risk they are allowed to assume on behalf of their superior. Training for MW therefore to 
a large extent focuses on the cognitive abilities of military leaders not only to make cunning 
and timely decisions to defeat their enemy but also to act in the absence of orders without 
unnecessary sacrifice of soldiers. Army education unfortunately tends towards detailed 
planning to appear cost-effective and justify budgets with concrete forecasting of unit 
training levels. The consequence is a focus on the ‘methodical battle: a set piece, closely 
orchestrated, slow moving battle, tightly controlled from a highly centralized command’, 
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which is rather an abstraction from actual war since it downplays the influence of friction 
and chance.119 According to Wyly, training and education must be towards ‘real war’ where 
the opponents’ friction should be augmented, and the opportunities offered by chance 
seized and exploited. For him, MW is ‘a fast-paced battle, loosely controlled and 
decentralized, highly responsive to a changing situation’ requiring substantial focus on 
cognitive abilities.120 Wyly also highlights the perils of training wrongly: ‘[…] when your 
troops cross the line of departure, […] the battle is joined. What's going to happen is what's 
going to happen. God help us! We hope we taught them right.’121 
 
The controversies over MW led to a renaming of the concept. In 1994, The British army 
deemed the term misleading and introduced ‘the Manoeuvrist Approach’ to focus on the 
cognitive domain rather than the opposition to ‘attrition’.122 NATO’s Joint Doctrine also 
endorses this concept.123 
 
MW places high requirements on tactical education. Beyond familiarising himself with 
military techniques, the junior officer needs to reach a level of proficiency within the school 
years so that he can make quick decisions independently, occasionally even contradicting 
stated orders, to seize fleeting moments in battle and promptly exploit them, subsequently 
causing enemy confusion. Thus, indicators of effective tactical education include 
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independent, quick and valid decision-making. We shall now see which implications these 
have for tactical education. 
 
2.3. Implications for tactical education 
Based on the previous sections’ analysis regarding tactics and manoeuvre warfare it is 
possible to discern certain educational requirements for teaching junior officers: technical 
skill and practical wisdom, as well as intuitive decision-making, both acquired through 
repetition.  
 
Tactics should be approached from two perspectives, art and science, aspiring to form 
‘universal judgment’ on warfare. In his article Wider Officer Competence, Carsten Rønnfeldt 
of the NMA analyses these concepts and links them to strategy based on Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics.124 He utilises Aristotle’s Technê and Epistêmê (examined in section 2.1) 
which converge in their pursuit of ‘universal judgement’, in addition to Phronesis, meaning 
practical wisdom. The latter relates to ‘knowing what is the right thing to do to achieve a 
common good in situations when there are several, often conflicting, objectives.’125 Since 
Epistêmê by definition relates to certain and eternal knowledge, Technê is more applicable 
to tactics since, as Clausewitz reminds us, ‘war is an act of human intercourse’ in which we 
can only hope to uncover mere general laws.126 Technê thus describes how to employ units 
in an engagement and Phronesis is knowing in which way these units can achieve victory and 
subsequently political ends. Technê is initially acquired by reproducing actions described in 
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field manuals that after many repetitions develop into skill and Phronesis is acquired through 
the development of critical thought and the subsequent reflection on numerous tactical 
case-studies.127 
 
Tactics is about decision-making; taking into account manoeuvre warfare, it is about speedy 
and creative decision-making, often under uncertain conditions and potentially contradicting 
higher command’s orders. Creativity and speed are made possible by relying on intuitive 
rather than analytical decision-making, illustrated by psychologist Kahneman’s ‘fast thinking’ 
system 1 and ‘slow thinking’ system 2, to be discussed below.128 Up to 90% of military 
decision-making is intuitive.129 This is what Napoleon and Clausewitz called coup d’oeil, the 
Germans Fingerspitzengefühl, the Japanese ishin denshin, and in English often referred to as 
‘gut feeling’.130 A greater emphasis on intuitive training has repeatedly been advocated by 
officers from the US Army131, the USMC132, the British Army,133 the Norwegian Army,134 the 
Australian Army,135 the US Navy136 and scholars.137 
 
Intuitive decision-making requires a ‘high-validity’ environment. It is possible to distinguish 
two contemporary approaches to intuition represented by the psychologists Daniel 
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Kahneman, advocate of heuristics and biases, and Gary Klein, proponent of naturalistic 
decision-making.138 These two approaches can be understood as opposites since the first 
claims that ‘intuitive judgment is commonly found to be flawed’, whilst the other pursues 
the ‘reliance on expert intuition in decision making’, i.e. that intuition is useful.139 Boyd’s 
‘patterns’ resemble Klein’s model. In their only joint journal article, Klein and Kahneman 
explain that their approaches are both valid, but in different circumstances and 
professions.140 Two conditions are necessary for intuitive decision-making to develop: first, 
the environment must provide adequately valid cues to the nature of the situation, so called 
‘high-validity’ environments. Second, people must have an opportunity to learn the relevant 
cues, i.e. repetition.141 
 
Engagements at the tactical level qualify as a ‘high-validity’ environment. According to 
Kahneman and Klein, these environments are characterised by ‘stable relationships between 
objectively identifiable cues and subsequent events, or between cues and the outcomes of 
possible actions.’142 Although wars may be unique, different engagements have an 
overwhelming number of similarities among them. Just as hunters from different continents 
and cultures would independently stalk prey in a similar manner, armies discern the 
objectively identifiable cues of an engagement in complementary ways. Clausewitz supports 
this because, unlike strategy, ‘the field of tactics […] is virtually limited to material factors.’143 
Both armies considered in this thesis, but also all Western armies, estimate engagements 
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through a finite set of characteristics called METT-TC: mission, enemy, terrain, troops 
available, time and civilian considerations; put more bluntly: terrain and people.144 
 
Despite its great variety, terrain offers identifiable cues that characterise it as a ‘high-
validity’ environment. Indeed, when composing his theory on decision-making, Klein 
observed how firefighters could foresee how a fire would develop based on cues in the 
environment, and intuitively make life-saving decisions.145 Although the locations of the fires 
were different, the firefighters could recognise analogous cues. Similarly, military leaders 
can appreciate a piece of terrain and recognise its characteristics, such as observation 
positions, fields of fire, cover, and concealment, revealing preferred ways of employing 
troops within it. According to Clausewitz, terrain is neutral, but the side that can best 
appreciate it will have an advantage in the engagement.146 Although the opponent in Klein’s 
case study, fire, arguably has no free will, it is nonetheless possible to apply a similar logic to 
humans. 
 
Within the limitations of an engagement, human behaviour is sufficiently predictable to 
qualify as being part of a ‘high-validity’ environment. Contrary to common belief, 
contemporary psychologists have demonstrated that humans are much less rational than 
they assume. Klein and Kahneman, in addition to Steven Pinker147 and Jonathan Haidt148, 
identify two selves within the human mind, one rational, analytical, controlled and slow 
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thinking mind, and another less rational; emotional, intuitive, automatic and fast thinking. 
They claim that what is often perceived as deliberate action is rather an intuitive response 
that has been rationalised in hindsight by the analytical self. Haidt illustrates this by stating 
that the mind is like a rider on an elephant. The rider represents the ‘conscious verbal 
reasoning, the stuff you are aware of, the stuff that uses logic [and] everything else is the 
elephant, it’s the automatic processes, it’s the 99% of the things going on in your mind that 
you are not aware of represents.’149 The rider might believe he is in control, but he is in fact 
relatively powerless compared to the larger elephant. In the case of the engagement, an 
opponent will unconsciously utilise his surroundings in an intuitive manner and it is thus 
possible to predict much of his behaviour through cultural familiarisation. This is the 
experience of a multitude of historical examples where, simply speaking, ‘the enemy acted 
according to plan’, or as illustrated by Patton’s exclamation in the famous 1970 movie when 
he realised how Rommel would act at El-Alamein: ‘Rommel, you magnificent bastard, I read 
your book!’.150 Patton understood Rommel’s thinking through becoming familiar with his 
reflections set forth in his writing. 
 
In addition, due to the physical nature of combat, commanders are prone to revert to the 
‘automatic mind’ when fatigued. Kahneman argues that engaging your analytical mind 
requires effort and that humans are predisposed for the ‘easy’ way through cognitive 
ease.151 However, should the opponent be aware of his own cognitive biases, the case for 
‘high validity’ is weakened. Seasoned fighters are usually difficult to defeat because they no 
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longer adhere to assumptions made about the enemy and act unpredictively; they opt for 
guile rather than force. Since graduating cadets are far from being experienced officers, 
military academies should therefore emphasise obtaining this awareness so they can avoid 
being fooled by their own intuition. This does not mean an abandonment of intuitive 
decision making, as that would mean sacrificing speed, but rather developing methods for 
the intuitive decision to fit the actual realities of a specific engagement. To use Kahneman’s 
expressions: adjust the fast solution offered by system 1 with the help of the rational system 
2 to produce a quick decision relevant to the present situation. The second requirement for 
intuitive decision-making is the opportunity to learn the relevant cues. The army offers 
numerous methods that give these opportunities, however the key to gaining good intuition 
lies in much repetition of these methods. 
 
Exposure to and repetition of tactical problem-solving is vital to building practical wisdom 
and good intuitive decision-making skills. Short of actual combat experience, peace-time 
field exercises are the main arena for accomplishing this. However, these are hardly frequent 
enough to enable the development of a wide enough experience base (Boyd’s ‘patterns’) 
required for intuitive decision-making within the time constrains of military academies. It is 
therefore necessary to supplement this with less resource-demanding training that allows 
for repetition. The usual methods utilised by military academies include: historical case-
studies, map exercises, tactical decision games, sand table exercises, war-gaming, tactical 
exercises without troops, and staff rides.152  
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Notable professionals have emphasised specific methods as key to teaching tactics. 
Clausewitz saw intuition as one of the qualities of the military genius153 and wrote extensive 
historical battle analyses.154 This has led historian Jon Sumida to argue that On War 
promotes intuition by advocating for ‘a novel form of historical case study that takes full 
account of the complex, difficult, and contingent nature of decision-making.’155 Moltke the 
Elder and his general staff presented tactical problems to their subordinates to use to 
further their tactical skills.156 The French subsequently replicated these after their defeat to 
namely Moltke.157 Many publications adopt a format based on series of ‘dreams’ to illustrate 
military thought-process and judgement. Here too Moltke’s General staff members were 
innovators,158 later imitated by British officers following the Boer War159 and WW1.160 There 
also exist contemporary versions on mechanized warfare,161 logistics,162 and counter-
insurgency.163 Also Rommel transcribed his tactical flair into useful decision-games164 and 
George Marshall sought to share WW1 experiences before his army would face the Axis.165 
These methods point to the necessity of avoiding textbook solutions and rather find ways to 
simulate ‘the chameleonic’ nature of war.166 
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The majority of the repetitions should include a human opponent. Using another student or 
a member of faculty to play the opponent increases teaching quality and is a major 
motivating factor for involved parties. ‘Playing’ against a human enemy allows room for 
creativity, uncertainty, unpredictability, etc. in contrast to a simulated opponent. In this way, 
a more realistic rendering of both chance and friction in war is possible. In addition, the 
mere fact that the opposition is being played by a colleague triggers competitive spirit and in 
turn emphasises the cunning side of both players. The outcome of these engagements is 
evidently of some interest; however, it is the processes that led to the different outcomes 
that is of the greatest value. 
 
It is the thought processes behind decisions, as opposed to their outcome, that contribute to 
better intuition and practical wisdom. By focusing on the reasoning behind a decision rather 
than the outcome it is possible to uncover the thinking process of the student. Through 
discussion, students also become aware of these processes and can identify occasions where 
their intuition trumped their reasoning; as Kahneman states, it is difficult to see one’s own 
biases, but much easier for others to detect them.167 A focus on repetition is also likely to 
punish the inexperienced student with repeated failure but the repercussions this can have 
on motivation and self-confidence can be mitigated through the creation of safe-to-fail 
environments.168 Also, as psychologists Baumeister et al. point out in their article Bad Is 
Stronger Than Good, failing is an effective cognitive tool for remembering events.169 
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In sum, the indicators of effective tactical education uncovered in this chapter are: fostering 
guile, shaping tactical judgement through a scientific approach, and training the application 
of this judgement in view of strategic objectives, as well as independent, quick and valid 
decision-making. The means for implementing these include training intuitive decision-
making with bias awareness and developing critical thinking through repetition of war-game-
like methods where reasoning and not outcome is central. We shall now see if these 
indicators are present in the USMC and NMA. 
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3. Case Study: United States Marine Corps 
3.1. Context 
The USMC is organisationally under the Department of the Navy and is regarded as the 
smallest branch among the US Armed Forces, receiving a fraction of the budget compared to 
the other branches.170 The USMC prides itself on its reputation for being ‘the world’s most 
feared and trusted force’ and of its focus on cultivating the cognitive domain in warfare to 
compensate for financial limitations.171 In 1989, General Gray officially endorsed MW as the 
USMC’s warfighting philosophy in Fleet Marine Force Manual no.1 (FMFM-1), known today 
as Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication no.1 Warfighting (MCDP-1).172 
 
3.2. Tactics 
The USMC’s definition of tactics encompasses both ‘art and science’ and focuses on breaking 
the will of the enemy. It was first formulated in FMFM-1 and based mainly on the thinking of 
Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and John Boyd, with input and advice also from William Lind.173 The 
original definition of tactics remains intact in MCDP-1,174 but is most explicitly presented in a 
linked publication,175 MCDP 1-3 Tactics: 
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[…] the art and science of winning engagements and battles. It includes the 
use of firepower and maneuver, the integration of different arms and the 
immediate exploitation of success to defeat the enemy.176 
MCDP-1’s author, John Schmitt, specifies that the definition’s starting point was the glossary 
of the recently published Department of Defense’s Joint Publication 1.177 He states that this 
was ‘a pretty conventional definition, […] consistent with Clausewitz’.178 However, he points 
out that ‘the thought of tactics as the art and science of winning battles and engagements 
was a favourite construction of Lind.’179 
 
In familiar USMC pragmatism, the definition overcomes the ‘art vs. science’ dichotomy by 
invoking both concepts. It states that science ‘includes those activities directly subject to the 
laws of ballistics, mechanics, and like disciplines’ and art ‘is the intuitive ability to grasp the 
essence of a unique military situation and the creative ability to devise a practical 
solution.’180. MCDP 1-3 also notes that science is antecedent to art because ‘without mastery 
of basic warfighting skills, artistry and creativity in their application are impossible.’181 This 
converges with the previous chapter’s arguments about tactics. 
 
The definition designates ‘defeat’ as the ambition of effect on the enemy implying a focus on 
his ‘will to fight’. Military syntax is precise and glossaries ensure army-wide consensus; 
MCDP 1-0 defines defeat as: ‘To disrupt or nullify the enemy commander’s plan and 
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overcome his will to fight, thus making him unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course 
of action and yield to the friendly commander’s will.’182 This supports MW’s focus on the 
cognitive domain. 
 
3.3. Manoeuvre Warfare 
The USMC’s approach to MW emphasises initiative, speed, intuitive decision-making and 
harmonisation of forces to defeat the enemy’s will to fight. MCPD-1 defines MW as: 
[…] a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion 
through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a 
turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot 
cope.183 
The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis and ‘an enemy who has lost the ability to resist.’184  
 
MW is central to the USMC. Its adoption followed the US Army’s and was not fully 
implemented until General Gray became Commandant and endorsed it. Prior to this there 
was resistance in the Corps, which pushed MW proponents to distil the concept’s core ideas 
and convince ‘non-believers.’185 Lind was directly consulted during the time of FMFM-1’s 
writing.186 He had just formulated his MW theory into the 1985 Maneuver Warfare 
Handbook187 and his contributions and clear formulations made the arguments and 
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explanations in 1989’s FMFM-1 stronger.188 The doctrine is laid out as a progressive 
argument that culminates on MW in the last chapter. In its peer publication, MCDP 1-3, the 
final chapter is devoted to ‘Making it happen’ and presents concrete educational methods 
for teaching manoeuvre warfare.  
 
The USMC’s philosophy of command is called mission tactics and bases itself on individual 
initiative according to commander’s intent to enable decentralisation and tempo in 
operations. 189 For low levels, it emphasises intuitive decision-making to generate the 
necessary speed required MW.190 Furthermore, decisions should be based on the actual 
situation and surroundings rather than what military procedure dictates, distinguished in 
MCDP-1 as ‘awareness and habit’.191 Lastly, to mitigate problems with cohesion and unity of 
effort in decentralisation, the doctrine calls for ‘implicit communication’ and ‘harmonious 
initiative’.192 This is to be accomplished through familiarity and trust which in turn are based 
on shared philosophy and shared experience, in sum thinking in the same way. The use of 
‘harmony’ is likely taken directly from Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict and refers to the level at 
which all the individuals of an army possess the same knowledge and act in the same 
manner.193  
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Since Lind et al. introduced MW to the USMC it is not surprising that its doctrinal application 
is in line with the previous chapter’s findings. What is more interesting is to see how this is 
reflected in the education of junior officers. 
 
3.4. Officer education system 
USMC officer education is composed of several schools that comprise the professional 
military education continuum (PME) (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 – USMC Professional Military Education Continuum (Expeditionary Warfare 
School, 2018a) 
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The entry point for officers in the USMC is through Officer Candidate School where there is 
also a formal requirement of having a college degree.194 The course lasts for 6-10 weeks and 
the school’s main purpose is to screen and evaluate potential Marine Corps Officers. The 
next level of education at The Basic School (TBS) starts immediately following graduation. It 
is unique to the USMC’s education model that every officer regardless of career field, 
aviation or lawyer for instance, must pass the course at TBS. During this 28 week-long 
course, students are taught the basics of being an ‘Officer of Marines’ and the warfighting 
skills required of a rifle platoon commander. This reflects the reputation of strong cohesion 
in the USMC in which ‘every Marine is, first and foremost, a rifleman; all other conditions are 
secondary.’195 It is also the materialisation of Boyd’s ‘harmony’ mentioned in the above 
section.  
 
After TBS officers further specialise in their respective career fields and eventually start their 
first assignment, usually as platoon commander. Once they reach Captain they are expected 
to enrol into the intermediate level school, Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS). The 
subsequent educational level is Command & Staff College (CSC) for field-grade/senior 
officers. As stated, this thesis limits itself to examining junior officer tactical education 
consisting of TBS and EWS.   
 
3.5. Teaching tactics 
Many of the indicators of effective tactical education are observable at USMC schools. The 
USMC has a clear understanding of the ‘art and science’ of tactics. As indicated in the blue 
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box on Figure 1, this first level concerns itself with ‘Training and Science’ and is a direct 
reference to the FMFM-1/MCDP-1’s definition of tactics. The green box denotes the period 
from 5 to 10 years of service in which officers attend EWS followed by CSC and involves 
‘Education and Art.’  
 
Every interviewee’s first statement on tactical education was that they taught ‘good 
judgement’, a confirmation of the previous chapter’s conclusion on tactics.196 According to 
the syllabus and observations made during the study trip to Quantico, USMC education of 
tactics to junior officers is based on repetition, developing critical thinking by discussing the 
reasoning behind decisions, and war-gaming/field-exercises with human opponents.  
 
TBS and EWS emphasise repetition to expose students to multiple scenarios, thereby 
training decision-making and expanding the junior officer’s reference/knowledge base. TBS’s 
teaching deliberately follows a progressive set of methods so that their students are 
familiarised with course material in five different ways: first a student handout with reading 
list, followed by a lecture and quiz, tactical decision game, sand table exercise and field 
exercise.197 EWS follows a similar structure albeit with more variation, particularly within the 
two Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations courses.198 
 
The USMC schools explicitly state that developing critical thinking is key and that they do so 
through questioning the reasoning behind decisions. MCDP-1 states ‘that the military 
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profession is a thinking profession’199 and multiple USMC commanders have reiterated that 
cultivating one’s critical thinking vital for PME.200 Reading three books per year from the 
Commandants reading list is mandatory.201 TBS and EWS course descriptions also specify the 
necessity for critical thinking and point out that the preferred method for attaining it is 
through Socratic questioning.202 In addition, the teachings of Kahneman analysed in section 
2.3 are incorporated into instructor training and subsequently used when questioning 
students about their decisions to see if it they are aware of their biases.203 CSC even defines 
critical thinking as ‘a process by which the thinker improves the quality of his or her thinking 
by skilfully taking charge of the structures inherent in thinking and imposing intellectual 
standards on them’, implying that developing critical thinking involves a raised awareness of 
one’s mental selves and adjusting how Kahneman’s system 1 and 2 interact.204 
 
Most instruction at TBS and EWS incorporates a form of war-gaming with human opponents 
to emulate war as a battle of wills marked by passion, enmity and chance.205 These range 
from simple tactical decision games reminiscent of Moltke’s and Rommel’s mentioned in 
section 2.3, sand-table exercises, double-blind Kriegsspiel,206 to full two-sided field 
exercises.207 The best publication on tactical decision games, Mastering Tactics, is also from 
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the USMC, written by FMFM-1’s author.208 This repertoire of methods enables even minor 
lessons to be illustrated in a realistic manner that contributes to decision-making. 
 
USMC schools also include contemporary research on decision-making processes. At TBS, all 
instructors are introduced to Kahneman’s systems. Through this knowledge they become 
aware of their students’ decision-making processes and can use their observations to raise 
awareness of student’s decisions through Socratic questioning.209 At EWS, faculty members 
are also made familiar with Kahneman’s teachings, but in greater detail.210 One of the first 
lessons is explicitly about cognitive processes and their influence on decisions. 211 In this 
manner, both teachers and students can observe and assist each other in pointing out 
biased as well as good decision-making. 
 
Lastly, EWS fosters creativity and the use of guile in their students. Most officers attending 
EWS have several years of experience in the operational units of the USMC. As noted by the 
proponents of manoeuvre warfare in section 2.2, during peacetime this large organisation 
risks emphasising predictability to the detriment of innovation. Therefore, one of the first 
events EWS students participate at consists in breaking down existing norms on warfare. 
During Leadership Decision-Making Events, usually in the form of land navigation courses, 
students are made aware of their own self-imposed limitations by juxtaposing their 
assumptions of fairness in a race with the possibility of using guile to gain victory. Instructors 
would hand out maps of a navigation course days before the event. ‘Rule-abiding’ students, 
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affected by the rigidity of military hierarchy, usually diligently wait until race day and 
complete the course within familiar rules for land navigation. Others opt for another 
approach: Prior to the race, cunning students reconnoitre the route and even sabotage signs 
and control points to throw their fellow students off course. On race day they have even 
used mountain bikes whilst the rest run on foot. The consequence of these popular events is 
a reinvigoration of creativity that is subsequently applied in class to create cunning plans 
that thus avoids predictable thinking.212 
 
In sum, almost every indicator of effective tactical education is observed in practice at USMC 
schools. As we shall see in chapter 5, what is lacking is a comprehensive link between tactical 
success and strategic objectives.   
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4. Case Study: Norwegian Army 
4.1. Context 
The Norwegian army has a patchwork of native and imported ideas as principles of warfare 
making tactical education challenging to harmonise due to subjective interpretation. 
Norway’s peripheral position in Europe and small size of its armed forces, thus limited 
capacity for research and innovation, has led to a tradition of officer exchange as 
compensation.213 These internationally educated officers are often rewarded with high 
positions and therefore greatly influence national doctrine. It is possible to discern three 
main historical influences that have shaped the present character of Norwegian military 
education: German from the 1850s and early 1900s, British during and after WW2, and 
American from the 1970s.214  
 
Mission Command in a form reminiscent of German Auftragstaktik existed in Norwegian 
doctrine from 1909.215 According to Major Torgersen, observations on the technical 
innovations in smokeless gunpowder, repeating rifles and breech-loading artillery in the 
German army and the consequences these had on military command triggered adjustments 
in the Norwegian Army.216   
 
British army influence marks Norwegian military education. During WW2, the Norwegian 
army existed in exile with its government in the UK. Assisted by the British army, it 
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continued to train to support the resistance and future liberation of Norway.217 From 1942, 
officers attended the relocated NMA in Kensington Palace Gardens.218 Norwegian officers 
even led British soldiers during Operation Overlord.219 One of these, Sverre Bratland, would 
give frequent lectures at the NMA, strongly advocating the British style of command and 
training.220 Norwegian Operational Doctrine also switched from US MW to the British 
‘Manoeuvrist Approach’ in 2007 whereas Army Doctrine has not.221 
 
US doctrinal changes are imitated in Norway. Since the major reforms following the Vietnam 
war, and especially in view of the success of the Gulf War, Norwegian officers returning from 
US schools imported influential aspects of American military thinking, notably MW which 
was formally introduced in 1995.222 Similar trends are visible with the adoption of Network 
Based Defence and Effect Based Operations.223 
 
The adoption of MW in the Norwegian army coincided with its transition from one based on 
territorial mobilisation and being predominantly defensive to one based on a professional 
and expeditionary style force which is predominantly offensive.224 Prior to the transition in 
2000, MW was used as an argument supporting professionalisation by amongst other 
former CHOD General Diesen and former Inspector of the Army General Mood.225 To 
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explicitly state how the Norwegian Armed Forces should be used in the post-Cold war 
security environment,226 the first joint doctrine was written in 2000 and endorsed MW.227 
This also signifies that the Cold War was not formally over until then for Norwegian Armed 
Forces.228 
 
Consequently, this myriad of influences has engendered many interpretations of military 
concepts, inhibiting their unified and cohesive application in the army. Whilst the NMA has 
diligently held itself updated on doctrinal changes and educated accordingly, here too, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, the interpretation is rather subjective.229 
 
4.2. Tactics 
The NMA’s definition of tactics is more precise than the Norwegian Joint Doctrine’s and 
encompasses both art and science, understood in the same manner as the USMC’s does.  
 
The only Norwegian doctrinal-level publication to give a definition to tactics is 2014 
Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine (FFOD), the current Joint Operational Doctrine. In its 
glossary, tactics is defined as the ‘use of military forces to solve given missions’,230 
reminiscent of a dictionary interpretation of the concept and general enough to be valid for 
all military branches on a joint level. The army’s equivalent publication, Forsvarets Doktrine 
for Landoperasjoner (FDLO) (Doctrine for Land Operations), lacks a clear definition of tactics 
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and leaves training and education according to doctrine left to subjective interpretation, 
which in turn does not contribute to cohesion. Compared to FFOD’14, the army’s doctrine 
does not explicitly state what meaning it gives to tactics. Rather, its meaning seems implied 
as the doctrine regularly refers to the ‘tactical use of land power’ and uses ‘tactics’ as an 
adjective on multiple occasions.231 In the section on combined effects, FDLO’04 states that 
‘there ought to be a high degree of tactical creativity and flexibility where unilateral and 
stereotypical approaches should be avoided.’232 The emphasis on creativity, which one 
would classify as an ‘art’, is repeated in the section on education where ‘the objective is to 
train the officer to be creative in thought and innovative in action.’233 Furthermore, the 
juxtaposition of ‘art and science of war’ is used exclusively in the introductory section which 
lays the theoretical foundations on the nature of war.234 This lack of depth in the elaboration 
of certain concepts is unfortunate and probably unintentional since this is after all the first, 
and to date, only publication outlining a warfighting philosophy for the Norwegian Army. 
These insufficient definitions have been addressed by instructors at NMA. 
 
The NMA defines tactics as ‘the art and science of using military means to win 
engagements.’235 In a 2016 internal memo, instructors in the Section for Tactics and 
Leadership proposed their own definition for tactics.236 They wanted to promote a better 
understanding of their subject than the existing definition in the 2014 joint doctrine, which, 
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according to them, is too shallow and ambiguous.237 In addition, these instructors wanted to 
improve cooperation between the NMA and the Army Weapon School, in charge of 
expertise and development for all arms.238 Their main issue was that the Weapon School’s 
understanding of officer education in tactics seemed limited to technique and battle drills, 
and centred teachings around the military planning process, something the USMC would 
classify as ‘science’. The instructors argued that this was insufficient since it did not address 
the creative problem-solving aspect of combat. A dialogue with the Weapon School was 
initiated but petered out due to organisational restructuring in 2017.239 However, the 
definition they proposed is still being used as the basis for how tactics is understood and 
taught at the academy.  
 
According to the internal memo, the NMA’s definition takes inspiration from NATO, USMC, 
US Army and British Army doctrines, though the final result is short of identical to the 
USMC’s. The author justifies this by highlighting the simplicity of the formulation and its 
ongoing usage, as well as the reasoned approach the USMC has in translating it into training 
and education expressed its doctrines.240 This means that the views on education, at least on 
paper, are similar to those of the USMC. 
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4.3. Manoeuvre warfare 
The Norwegian Army’s approach to MW emphasises initiative, speed, and intuitive decision-
making to defeat the enemy’s will, but suffers from detrimental discrepancies across 
doctrines.  
 
MW in Norwegian doctrine is similar to the USMC’s. The 2014 Norwegian Joint Operational 
Doctrine (FFOD) states that ‘land forces operate according to a manoeuvre-oriented 
approach and emphasise mission-based leadership in planning and execution of 
operations.’241 It builds on the antecedent doctrine’s still valid theoretical framework242 
where: 
Manoeuvre thinking is to understand the psychological aspect of combat. 
Combat is a battle between wills, dominated by uncertainty, friction and 
chaos. By mastering these challenges better than the opponent, we can 
nonetheless turn them to our own advantage.243 
FFOD’07 differentiates between what it calls manoeuvre thinking and manoeuvre method 
but outlines as a whole an ‘operational method’ reminiscent of USMC MW. The goal is ‘to 
influence the opponent’s will to continue fighting’ and ‘emphasizes surprise, initiative, 
indirect approach, speed and mission command.’244 
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Norwegian Joint Doctrine confuses the meaning of MW. The former presence of manoeuvre-
method/thinking/ability/theory/etc. in both FFOD’00 and FFOD’07 as well as in the army’s 
FDLO’04 reveal imprecision in communicating MW comprehensibly. Their deliberate 
removal in the 2014 doctrine is according to its main author, Lieutenant Colonel Ydstebø, an 
attempt at reducing this confusion. 245 Still, it might also indicate a more widespread 
uncertainty within the army. The same officer also highlights existing misunderstandings and 
paradoxes regarding MW’s Mission Command in a recent publication.246 
 
Norwegian doctrine is therefore not clear with regards to how it interprets MW: joint level 
publications diverge from army-level ones and cause confusion at the tactical level. After all, 
as former manoeuvre proponent and ex-CHOD General Diesen states, it is quite absurd that 
a standing army of 30 main battle tanks and 40 infantry fighting vehicles aspires to a way of 
war successfully executed by those with many regiments of armoured vehicles.247 
Nonetheless, disregarding the doctrine’s deficiencies, the Norwegian Army’s approach to 
MW is similar, in doctrine, to the USMC’s. 
 
4.4. Officer education system 
The Norwegian Army’s officer education consists of three levels, basic, advanced and higher, 
in addition to the initial non-commissioned officer school (NCO) every officer was required 
to have until 2018 (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2 - Norwegian officer education until 2018 (Forsvaret, 2015) 
 
General university admissions certification and NCO education were the only educational 
criteria for application until 2018.248 Cadets receive their commission and an undergraduate 
degree after three years. The next level of education is the Command & Staff College which 
usually occurs after 10-15 years and after having served as company commander. There is 
no formal schooling between these levels apart from some officers selected for international 
captain-level courses such as USMC’s EWS or US Army’s Captain-Career-Courses. 
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4.5. Teaching tactics 
Several indicators of effective tactical education are identifiable at the NMA. However, 
training decision-making and developing critical thinking through repetition is likely not 
sufficient enough to reach a desired level upon graduation.  
 
Tactics is taught as a stand-alone subject in the context of three semester-long 
multidisciplinary courses called ‘Command of Operations’ starting with high intensity 
warfare, followed by national crisis management, ending with peace-keeping and 
counterinsurgency.249 The teaching method is case-based where all the subjects of a course 
utilise historical events as a reference point of their lectures. Tactics as a subject is 
structured around a standard undergraduate teaching model incorporating readings, 
lectures and seminars. The objective is to learn ‘how to think, and not what to think’.250 The 
actual military decision-making and planning process is taught in another subject called 
‘Method’ but used extensively in the tactics classes as it forms the basic structure in how to 
think about tactical problems.251 Lessons on tactics range from combined arms, MW, to 
counterinsurgency and peace support operations. Theory is then supported by practical 
application. 
 
The practical arenas are composed of 7 field exercises and a month-long Platoon 
Commander’s Course. In addition, depending on the teacher, classroom lessons may also 
include tactical decision games or some form of computer simulation. Each semester is 
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accentuated with a field exercise that serves as a practical arena for the type of tactics 
learned that period. Every student is required to successfully accomplish at least one 
assignment as platoon commander to pass the tactics course. In the month before 
graduation students attend a Platoon Commander’s Course within their field of speciality. 
This course is organised by the Weapon Schools and varies greatly in content. For the 
manoeuvre arms it usually consists of repetitions of several short offenses or defences.  
 
In sum, only some indicators of effective tactical education are observed in practice at NMA. 
Their approach to tactical education is sound, however their weighing of theory and practice 
is sub-optimal. Tactics becomes one of many subjects that competes for resources. Thus, 
there does not seem to be enough time for the many repetitions necessary to shape and 
train tactical judgement. Practice is mainly in the form of field exercises and less resource-
demanding war-gaming-methods are hardly employed. A similar observation can be made 
regarding training intuitive decision-making and awareness of cognitive biases.   
 61 
5. Converging teaching and practice 
The USMC schools and the NMA have both identified the need to approach tactics from the 
scientific and artistic perspective to shape judgement and make decisions. They also 
converge in the understanding of MW in the requirement for speed and creativity to affect 
the enemy’s will to fight. They differ, however, in the balance between teaching tactical skill 
and understanding the strategic-tactical link. The USMC, due to a predominantly Anglo-
Saxon teaching method called Curriculum Studies (CS), provides its junior officers with a 
systematic flow of practical arenas. The NMA emphasises theory and favours bridging 
strategy and tactics to the detriment of practice.  
 
5.1. Teaching methods 
The USMC and NMA’s teaching methods diverge markedly and reflect national trends of 
their respective countries. Norwegian schools adhere to didactics, rooted in German 
Bildung, whilst American ones follow CS, as most Anglo-Saxon countries do.252 The main 
distinction is their weighing between how and what to teach: ‘Didaktik’ refers to the art of 
teaching - a set of principles that all schoolteachers should follow; and CS relates to the body 
of knowledge that schoolteachers can communicate through their teaching.253 Although 
professor of pedagogy David Hamilton states that this polarisation is a mere simplification of 
the expressions, the choice between emphasising teacher or content has nonetheless 
marked how education is conducted.254 According to Dr. Tero Autio, didactics is more 
‘sensitive to personal variance among teachers, allowing them more intellectual and 
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professional freedom to think and accomplish their tasks’, whereas American colleagues 
‘seem more strictly controlled by the systemic needs of education administration and by the 
expertise of scholars and scientists’.255 
 
Education in USMC schools enables a high level of similarity between graduating officers, 
what Boyd calls ‘harmonisation’, but takes little account for individual variations in both 
students and teachers. Every single activity has a detailed lesson plan that has been 
developed over multiple iterations of the same course with only minor adjustments made. 
At TBS, it is easier to adjust an existing lesson rather than attempt to implement a new one 
because the necessary justifications for doing so require significant effort: since the USMC is 
the only service in the US Defense requiring all of its officers, regardless of specialisation, to 
pass the infantry warfighting course at TBS, any major modifications or expansions need to 
be vetted by those in charge of USMC budgets.256 Keeping abreast of current trends is 
therefore accomplished by altering existing courses. Furthermore, to uphold an adequate 
standard on lesson delivery, every new faculty member must undergo a rigid qualification 
test. This results in a hierarchy among instructors, from ‘basic’ to ‘master’, with internal 
competition of reaching these levels in time.257 Teachers will thus conform to an existing 
norm of instructing, regardless of their individual pedagogical abilities. This ensures a 
standard quality of teaching but risks foregoing contributions from talented teachers. Yet 
positions at USMC schools are usually held only for three years. From an employer’s 
perspective, focused on meeting deadlines, keeping budgets and providing consistent 
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education, predictability is arguably preferred even if it eschews occasional talent. In sum, 
the USMC’s teaching system places the curriculum first and ensures that every graduating 
officer has been exposed to the same lessons and been taught them the same way to the 
detriment of the individual teacher’s freedom of action. 
 
The education of tactics at the NMA displays variations between graduating classes 
depending on the quality of the teacher, despite being guided by the same teaching aims. 
The subject tactics has explicit teaching aims stated in the annual course descriptions. 258 
Constructing a lesson plan that fulfils these, as well as selecting the syllabus, is entirely up to 
the teacher.259 As long as his plan stays within financial and time constraints, he enjoys great 
freedom in choosing how to convey his knowledge. This means that the teacher is free to 
adjust his lessons according to the level of his students and the circumstances surrounding 
his course. Furthermore, there is consensus that such workplace autonomy is a key factor 
contributing to employee motivation.260 However, tactics as a subject relies on the regular 
rotation of officers to remain up-to-date and relevant. Similarly to the USMC schools, NMA 
tactics instructors are therefore usually employed for only three to four years. Despite 
enjoying freedom of action, the relatively short employment period severely limits the time 
available to gain competency in teaching and subsequently causes significant variations 
between classes.  
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 64 
Tactics is likely better taught with CS. The two teaching methods have different advantages: 
CS ensures a standard of teaching across multiple classes while didactics allows for 
adjustments depending on student and teacher qualities. However, given the fact that 
tactics is a subject reliant on current knowledge and therefore on a constant influx of 
officers with or without prior teaching experience, and that an army ‘in harmony’ is more 
effective, a CS model offers more predictability and reproducibility compared to the didactic 
method. In fact, the lower educational levels in the Norwegian Army, such as the NCO school 
and the basic training programme,261 have already opted for CS. This shift seems to have 
happened out a necessity for ‘harmonisation’. Adopting CS at the NMA would therefore not 
be unheard of and likely be beneficial. 
 
5.2. USMC approach to building judgement and decision-making 
The contrast between the USMC schools’ systematic approach to shaping tactical judgement 
and training decision-making and the more theoretical methods used at NMA is pronounced. 
 
Students are exposed to a plethora of tactical problems at USMC schools. Since we earlier 
established that tactics aspires to shape judgement based on the analysis of tactical 
problems, there is a direct correlation between the number of problems one is exposed to 
and the quality of one’s judgment. This naturally presupposes the ability to successfully 
analyse these problems. The practical arenas available at the NMA are the 7 field exercises, 
the occasional tactical decision game or simulation, and the Platoon Commander’s Course 
just before graduation. In comparison, TBS approaches every single lesson through 5 distinct 
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methods with emphasis on practical application. Since TBS is comprised of approximately 50 
lessons, students can expect to be exposed to a tactical problem about 250 times. A similar 
approach is used at EWS.  
 
Students become more aware of their cognitive decision-making process at USMC schools 
than at the NMA. TBS instructors are made aware of Kahneman’s systems, and at EWS, the 
students also receive specific lessons on them. This provides faculty members and students 
with a framework and vocabulary utilised to discuss how decisions are made and learn how 
to avoid bias. In contrast, apart from the self-taught teachers and students, the NMA 
curriculum does not address cognitive processes comprehensively. The only course aspiring 
to shape a specific way of thinking is ‘Method’ where some references to Kahneman are 
included.  
 
USMC schools provides students with many decision-making arenas. In conjunction with the 
focus on the repetition of tactical problems, students at TBS and EWS are repeatedly forced 
to make decisions, often under pressure. These decisions are vetted by instructors for their 
quality and expose possible biases in their judgment. Over many iterations, the student 
becomes aware of his though-process and can adjust it to improve both quality and speed. 
Likewise, this awareness gives students the ability to detect what constitutes good and bad 
tactics in their surroundings, be it in their fellow students at school or with colleagues in 
operational units. The same cannot be said to exist at the NMA. The closest arena focusing 
on repetition is the Platoon Commander’s Course just before graduation, and even here, 
there is nowhere near as much focus on decision-making as at the USMC schools. 
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The USMC’s educational methods are well designed the successful shaping of tactical 
judgement. This systemised approach, a product of the CS-model, enables great similarity 
between school years and thus provides ‘harmony’ between officers, especially regarding 
how to think about tactics. It also lays the foundation for self-learning more robustly than at 
the NMA. By shaping judgement through repetition and critique, the schools ensure that 
their students will be able to independently recognise and understand good and bad tactics 
in their surroundings after graduation. However, due to the size of US armed forces and the 
arguably long command chain from junior officer to field-grade officers, the link between 
tactics and strategy is less marked at TBS and EWS, but more so at the NMA. 
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5.3. NMA emphasis on strategy-tactics link 
The curriculum at TBS and EWS is geared towards warfighting. It is only at Command and 
Staff College that a ‘war studies’ course appears and strategic literature is studied. This 
contrasts with the NMA where, due to the Norwegian Army’s small size and the lack of an 
intermediate level education, the link to strategy is emphasised from the beginning. 
 
The NMA’s approach to junior officer education is multi-disciplinary. Tactics as land power 
forms the core of the degree, but many ‘context’-subjects help highlight the link to strategy. 
After admission, the first courses are ‘The Officer and the State’ followed by ‘The Officer and 
the War’ which connect military history and strategy to tactics.262 The case-based method 
serves as a point of reference for all subjects, enabling the parallel teaching of tactics and 
strategy. All three semesters during which tactics is taught are also accentuated by field 
exercises. The theory acquired is then put into practice with all subjects represented. The 
rationale is that in today's volatile security situation where the spectrum of conflict ranges 
from conventional war to hybrid operations it is essential to understand strategic thinking to 
act tactically. 
 
There is however a major drawback with the NMA’s approach to tactics. With all the time 
allocated to the ‘context’ subjects, too little remains for shaping tactical judgement. Since 
this is developed through repetitive practical application, their scarce number may not be 
enough for most students to reach an adequate quality of tactical judgement. The same can 
be said for decision-making and raising awareness of cognitive bias.  
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5.4. Theory-convergence but practice-divergence 
As we have discovered, the USMC and the NMA converge in their theoretical framework 
regarding tactics. Both identify the same scientific and artistic qualities and their doctrines 
emphasise speed and decentralisation. The teaching methods are also identical despite 
different educational cultures. However, when it comes to balancing tactics and strategy, the 
schools diverge in their practical application.  
 
The USMC pursues a consistent shaping of tactical judgement and establishment of critical 
thought, whilst the NMA appears too shallow in its approach. USMC junior officers graduate 
with markedly more experience in tactics than their Norwegian counterparts. More 
important, though, they have acquired a greater degree of judgement and critical thought 
concerning tactics, enabling future self-learning during time with their unit. Conversely, since 
there is no intermediate formal education for the 10-15 years before staff college, the NMA 
is obliged to cover this stretch to the detriment of the depth it can pursue in tactics. This 
justifies the increased focus on strategy with many ‘context’-subjects that compete for 
attention with core subjects such as land power.263 USMC instructors repeatedly stated that 
junior officers have enough ‘coping with themselves’ during TBS and few can recall the more 
advanced nuances, such as those regarding strategy, from the many lessons they endured.264 
The same situation is observable at the NMA where, instead of becoming confident decision-
makers, cadets appear more unassertive and confused due to the many strategic 
considerations they must contemplate. This is highly detrimental because junior officers who 
                                                        
263 Hanssen (2016) 
264 Director of Warfighting (2018) 
 69 
cannot properly utilise their own forces effectively are unlikely to advance strategic 
objectives, rather, they are more prone to cause negative strategic effects by their lack of 
practice. Concerning the USMC, the situation is neither entirely positive. With the increasing 
consequences of actions taken at the tactical level, the relatively long period without formal 
education on strategy may have detrimental effects.  
 
USMC and Norwegian Army integration can be improved with analogous tactical education. 
Since the theoretical framework and educational methods are identical, calibrating the 
NMA’s lessons plans and practical execution of teaching tactics could suffice in engendering 
the same results witnessed at USMC schools. This means adopting the CS-model in tactics to 
compensate for the regular rotation of instructors needed for keeping up-to-date, 
implementing the systematic use of practical arenas with a human opponent to enable a 
high repetition of tactical problems, and increasing the focus on discussing the reasoning 
behind decisions to highlight correct ways of analysing a problem and to expose cognitive 
bias. USMC should consider introducing ‘war studies’ and strategy earlier than at CSC-level. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
As stated, effective tactical education is accomplished by fostering guile, shaping tactical 
judgement through a scientific approach and training the application of this judgement in 
view of strategic objectives, as well as independent, quick and valid decision-making. The 
means for implementing these include training intuitive decision-making with bias 
awareness and developing critical thinking through repetition of war-game-like methods 
where reasoning and not outcome is central.  
 
The case studies uncovered that the USMC schools and the NMA have a near identical 
theoretical approach to teaching tactics, but it is in the practical execution that there are 
differences. The USMC focuses on warfighting whereas the NMA emphasizes the link 
between tactics and strategy. 
 
USMC and Norwegian Army integration is likely to increase and the effectiveness of this 
integration can be improved with few adjustments to tactical education. For the NMA this 
means amongst other an emphasis on repetition to shape tactical judgement, and for the 
USMC a greater focus on the link to strategic objectives.  
 
Since the literature comparing tactical education is scarce and military integration is likely to 
increase also between other states, future research could include similar case studies based 
on the same indicators for effective tactical education determined in this thesis. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 - Existing literature comparing military education 
Book Source Compared institutions Period 
Military Schools (Barnard, 1969) Academy-level:  
Austria, Bavaria, France, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, 
Prussia, Russia , Saxony, Sweden, Switzerland & the US 
1862-1872 
The Training of Officers (van Creveld, 1990) Staff School-level:  
France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia & the US 
1815-1990 
Forging the Sword: Selecting, 
Educating and Training Cadets 
and Junior Officers in the 
Modern World 
(Converse, 1998) Academy-level:  
China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Israel, Japan, 
Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, Russia & the US 
1790-1998 
Command Culture (Muth, 2011) Academy and Staff School-level: 
Germany & the US 
1901-1945 
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Appendix 2 - Relevant military journals and magazines 
Journal Institution Search method Period reviewed 
Parameters US Army War College Manual review of the table of contents 1971-2018 
Military Review US Army Command and General Staff College “ 2000-2018 
Infantry Magazine US Army Infantry School “ 2000-2018 
Armor Magazine US Army Armor Centre “ 2000-2018 
Joint Forces Quarterly US National Defense University “ 2000-2018 
Marine Corps Gazette USMC Paywall except for articles on MW N/A 
Infinity Journal  Manual review of the table of contents 2010-2018 
Journal of Military Operations  “ 2012-2016 
    
Websites    
Modern Warfare Institute US Army Military Academy Keyword search: ‘USMC, Norway, 
tactics, education, integration’ 
 
Foreign Military Studies Office US Army “  
Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College “  
Long War Journal  “  
Small Wars Journal  “  
Strategy Bridge  “  
Institute for the Study of War  “  
Defence One  “  
War on the Rocks  “  
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Appendix 3 – List of interviews 
USMC Expeditionary Warfare School’s Director of Curriculum Development and senior 
instructor. (2018). Interview with Reidar Ursin and Philip Matlary. 30 April, Geiger 
Hall, Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA. 
 
USMC The Basic School’s Director of Warfighting and two senior instructors. (2018) 
Interview with Reidar Ursin and Philip Matlary. 2-3 May, Heywood Hall, Camp 
Barrett, Quantico, VA. 
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Appendix 4 - Literature on tactics from antiquity 
Author Date Book Title Origin Source Particular references to guile 
Unknown  8-4thcentury BCE Thirty-Six Stratagems Chinese (Lévi, 2008) The entire work is devoted to 
stratagems. 
Sun Tzu 5thcentury BCE The Art of War Chinese (Sun Tzu, 1996) Major parts of this work concerns guile. 
Aeneas 4thcentury BCE Siege Defense Greek (Aeneas Tacticus, 2001) §2; §15; §16; §18; §27; §28; §29; §39. 
Asclepiodotus 1st century BCE Outline of Tactics Greek (Asclepiodotus, 2001) Purely technical study of historical 
phalanxes. 
Onasander 54 CE Strategikos (The General) Greek (Onasander, 2001) §10.5; §21; §23; §28; §32; §41. 
Sextus Julius Frontinus 1st century CE Strategemata Roman (Frontinus et al., 1993) This entire text is a collection of 500 
stratagems/uses of guile. It is believed 
to have been an appendix to a work on 
strategy. 
Aelian 2nd century CE On Tactical Arrays of the Greeks  Roman 
  
(Aelianus and Matthew, 
2012) 
N/A. Few parts of this book have 
survived.  
(Same original source as Arrian) 
Arrian c.136 CE Techne Tactica Greek/Roman (Kiechle, 1965) N/A. Few parts of this book have 
survived.  
 Polyænus 2nd century CE Stratagems in War Macedon (Polyænus and Sheperd, 
1793) 
This entire book is a description of 833 
Greek and Roman stratagems (although 
some are rather mythological). 
Publius Flavius Vegetius 
Renatus 
4th century CE De re militari (Epitome of Military 
Science) 
Roman (Vegetius Renatus and 
Milner, 2011) 
III.7-9-10-18-19-20-21-26; IV.20-26-30. 
Emperor Maurice 6nd century CE Strategikon Byzantine (Maurice and Dennis, 
1984) 
II.5; IV;VII §2.4-7-15; VIII §1.7-8-9-10-
11-16-19-20-21-22-27-28 §2.4-5-6-28-
29-31-38-48-49-56-76-77-87-94-95-99; 
IX; X.1-2-4; XI. 
Unknown 6nd century CE Treatise on Strategy Byzantine (Dennis, 1985c) §33; §37; §40;  
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Emperor Leo VI 895–908 CE Taktika (The Tactical Constitutions) Byzantine (Dennis, 2010) §4.51; §7,29; §12.3-4-5-58-106-107-
108; §14.11--26-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-
40-41-42-96-97-98; §15.5-8-9-20-22-41; 
§17.5-10-11-13-20-59-60; §18; §20.109-
123-124-141-144-147-150-151-154-
155-161-168-177-212 
Unknown  10th century CE Sylloge Tacticorum Byzantine (Chatzelis and Harris, 
2017) 
§85; §87 
Emperor Nikephoros II 
Phokas 
965 CE Praecepta Militaria Byzantine (McGeer, 2008) N/A. Few parts of this book have 
survived.  
 Unknown (Leo Phokas?) 970 CE De velitatione bellica (On 
Skirmishing) 
Byzantine (Dennis, 1985b) §4; §8; §10; §11; §12; §13; §17; §19; 
§20 
Nikephoros Ouranos 10nd century CE Taktika Byzantine (McGeer, 2008) §63. Few parts of this book have 
survived. 
Unknown 10nd century CE Campaign Organization and Tactics Byzantine (Dennis, 1985a) §23; §25; §26. 
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